"In the course of its actions....Company H let go with 92,000

rounds of machine gun fire and 1,200 rounds of 81-mm. mortars.

With this `superb supporting fire,' the infantry advance was

`beautifully executed and never faltered.' Hill 350 was

recaptured by mid-afternoon. For its actions, the

Second Battalion received a Presidential Unit Citation."

"Two major generals and myself watched the action.

The generals said it was the finest action they had seen

in this war - or the last one."

Colonel Greer

The contrast between two of the most heralded generals of World War II - George Patton and Omar Nelson Bradley, could not have been greater. Yet, each oversaw the command of the 1st Infantry Division and had a profound influence on the division's growth as a fighting force.

Unlike the privileged environment and wealth that shaped Patton, Bradley came from a family of modest farmers in Missouri. In his memoirs, he described them as "all plain, proud, honest, hardworking and poor.....desperately poor."

Like Pfc. Baummer, he lost his father when he was in his teens. Bradley eventually graduated from high school, but without money to go to college, he took a job with the Wabash Railroad where he worked in the boiler shop fixing steam engines.

When his mother remarried, Bradley decided to go to college and, although his first choice was the University of Missouri, his Sunday school teacher convinced him to try to get into West Point. He subsequently wrote a letter to his local congressman and he was eventually given an alternate appointment behind the local sheriff's son.

Bradley crammed for the tests on the train to St. Louis and then struggled through the difficult exams over the next four days. About three weeks later, he received a telegram stating he had been appointed to West Point. Bradley's years at the Academy were mixed with military training and academics and he graduated 44th out of 164. One of his classmates was a blond-haired Kansas boy by the name of Dwight D. Eisenhower who wrote anonymously in their 1914 class yearbook of Bradley: "True merit is like a river, the deeper it is, the less noise it makes." He also penned, "His most promising characteristic is ‘getting there.’ If he keeps up the clip he's started, some of us will some day be bragging to our grandchildren that, ‘Sure General Bradley was a classmate of mine.'"

After graduating, Bradley was assigned to an infantry regiment at Fort George Wright, just outside of Spokane, Washington. While he was there, the Civil War broke out in Mexico. Although he was called to the border, tensions had eased by the time he arrived and instead of his first crack at the war front, he ended up in Yuma, Arizona. During this tour of duty he married his childhood sweetheart, Mary Quale, while he was on Christmas leave.

Bradley again missed a combat assignment during World War I. Instead, a frustrated Bradley was assigned to command a unit charged with guarding a copper mine in Montana and the closest he came to warfare was to quell a labor riot on St. Patrick's Day in 1918. Still, he was promoted to major.

Two years later, Bradley returned to West Point where he taught mathematics for four years. Then, through connections, he engineered an assignment to move to the Infantry School at Fort Benning where he studied tactics and strategy.

During his tenth year with the Army, Bradley was finally given his first overseas assignment and he was put in charge of an infantry battalion in Honolulu, Hawaii. His principal duty was "to protect Pearl Harbor and to prevent a Japanese attack on or an invasion of the Island of Oahu." It was 1925.

He left the island paradise far ahead of the attack that brought the United States into World War II and headed to the Army's Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. After receiving more training in war planning and management, he ended up back at Fort Benning and soon found himself on the staff of General George C. Marshall. Bradley vividly remembered this period that began a twenty-year association between the two, writing later, "No man had a greater influence on me personally or professionally."

It was now 1930 and the beginning of the Depression years. The entire Army consisted of 138,000 men and Congress slashed new budgets for supplies and weapons. "In those dark days," Bradley remembered, "When almost every family in America was struggling to survive, and the possibility of war seemed as remote as the moon, money for a standing Army seemed an absurd luxury."

After a brief stint at the War College in 1933, Bradley went back to West Point and taught battlefield tactics. His duties were "to develop character, soldierly manhood, loyal discipline, gentlemanly conduct; to build physical strength, stamina and the co-ordination necessary for prolonged and arduous field service, and to instruct every cadet in combat exercises."

While Nazi aggression terrorized Europe, Bradley did just this. In 1939 he was again reunited with George Marshall, who hand picked him for his staff because of Bradley's judgment and professionalism. Bradley assisted Marshall, who was now Army Chief of Staff, in preparing budgets to bring before congress that sought large increases in military spending. Remembering his work at the time, Bradley later wrote, "I was still in awe and some fear of the man. I was never at ease when I made a presentation. No matter how well I knew my subject, he was apt to ask pertinent questions on something I didn't know. I was almost certain to be tripped up every time. Often he would become angry at my failings. Never shouting angry, merely icy cold and withdrawn. He kept us worked up to a nerve-racking degree."

During the fall of 1940, just before Pfc. Baummer arrived at Fort Devens to begin his military training, Major Bradley was offered the job of being commandant of the cadets at West Point. Marshall, however, dissuaded him and suggested his next assignment should provide a more direct path for promotion to inevitable overseas duty. Bradley eventually took Marshall's old job as commandant of the Infantry School at Benning and was promoted directly to brigadier general.

His first love was the infantry, but Bradley's efforts during his tour at Fort Benning included implementing new tank and airborne combat training methods. During one of Marshall's visits in late 1941, the Army Chief of Staff urged him to start thinking about who his new replacement would be.

"On the afternoon of Sunday, December 7th," Bradley remembered, "Mary and I were working in the yard pruning a flower bed. An old friend and his wife stopped by and asked if we had heard the news. Pearl Harbor had just been bombed by the Japanese. Like all Americans that day, we were stunned. I immediately put on my uniform and hurried to post headquarters, where my staff was already gathered, speaking in hushed, somber tones."

Before the end of the year, Bradley was named commandant of the first full-scale airborne division in the Army, the famous 82nd, which was then in training at Camp Claiborne, just outside of Alexandria, Louisiana. Then, in June of 1942, as Pfc. Baummer was making his way to Indian Town Gap in Pennsylvania and preparing for overseas disembarkation, Bradley was given command of the 28th Division of the National Guard. Although this assignment disappointed Bradley, their units needed a disciplinarian like him. Finally, on February 16th in 1943, while Pfc. Baummer was completing his forty-seventh day in combat in North Africa and marching towards Kasserine Pass, Bradley received the phone call he had been waiting for. It was the head of Army personnel in Washington, who informed him, "We're cutting orders for you today, Brad. You're going overseas on extended active duty. Not the division - just you." A confused Bradley asked what kind of clothes he should bring and his caller answered, "Remember your classmate? You're going to join him."

After the arrival of General Bradley at II Corps during the second week of April in 1943, the battlefield at El Guettar was deserted. Only a few small units were left behind to clean up the mess in the oasis. There were hundreds of menacing mines amongst colorful flowers, still unexploded, which needed to be disarmed. Bodies were scattered on the silent sands of the desert near piles of shell casings and burnt-out tanks. Shabby, desperate Arab natives were picking at the personal effects of the dead before they could be gathered up and eventually sent home to relatives.

Occasionally, some of these demonic grave robbers stepped on one of the nasty, three-pronged anti-personnel mines left by the Germans for Allied soldiers, settling the score for the defenseless heroes. Meanwhile, Graves Registration personnel were placing the bodies of dead GIs into mattress covers, sealing them, then loading these fallen warriors onto trucks for delivery to the nearby "skull orchards" that served as temporary cemeteries.

By this time, Pfc. Baummer and the 18th Infantry had been ordered back to Gafsa, location of the "fortress" quickly abandoned by the Germans and the Italians before the massacre at El Guettar. Word quickly spread around revealing that there were warm, natural ancient Roman baths in Gafsa and every soldier found time to frolic in the waters, light-heartedly throwing soap at each other and laughing at their freshly-shaven faces.

As always, a good story seemed to spread fast. One unit had seen an old latrine trench with garlands of flowers strung across it by the natives. It seemed they had mistaken the date-marker above it for a burial cross and were tending to the ditch as if it were now a shrine.

The men of the 18th Infantry, who Bradley described as "tanned, lean and cocky," were eventually ordered out on a motor-march southward to a new assembly area. The convoy was soon threading along a good macadam highway, rolling through beautiful sections of the Tunisian desert. It was spring and the frustrating, battle-dampening rains of winter had turned the landscape into lush green shrubs and flowers. Eventually, the 18th arrived at a hillside village called Morsott, where the entire 1st Division set up camp near a coal mine and rested for nearly a week while waiting for new orders.

Terry Allen even had time to reflect during this lull in the action. He was always an ardent supporter of his men, including his officers. His loyalty to Colonel Greer was particularly special. Allen remained convinced Greer had been unfairly criticized during the Longstop Hill fiasco and during the inconsequential actions that followed before Kasserine Pass. But, he felt Gafsa and El Guettar redeemed Greer and the entire Division because, in large part, it was fighting together again as a unit. He relayed his feelings in a letter to Mary Fran on April 4^th:

Allen also took the opportunity to vent his frustrations about being criticized in the past for not being a sterner disciplinarian around his troops. Some general officers such as Eisenhower, Bradley and even George Marshall thought he was too lax. But, in the same letter, he shared these thoughts with Mary Fran:

"....For a long time I retained a file of the proceedings of the ridiculous investigation made of me at Indian Town Gap, Pa. I also kept General Marshall's letter reiterating ridiculous allegations made against my personal habits and qualifications as a leader..... But, when we started for the front in the last jaunt, I burned all that stuff, not wishing to face this last acid test with any rancor or ill-will in my mind or in my heart.

The quick completion of this terrible and nasty job is too important to let oneself be influenced by the feeble-minded efforts of "muck-rakers" who tear down their betters. It has all been just too ridiculous to even worry over, although I must admit it did give me some anxious hours. When I consider the importance and effectiveness of our present accomplishments it all seems as ridiculous as the usual type of vicious and ill-formed gossip.....When it is all said and done, the only persons whose good opinions and confidences I really crave are you and Sonny. All others are small change to me. So, `what the hell.'"

After a few words to Mrs. Allen about their personal finances, the General closed his letter with:

"I have been attending mass quite regularly and have received communion several times in the past weeks. I never commit one of our units to battle without a prayer for their success, for their effectiveness and the reasonable safety of our men. With God's help I think we may continue to `call the right signals,' and I feel sure that my luck will hold..."

But before Allen's letter reached Mary Fran, the General had received a letter from her that prompted him to respond to comments Mrs. Allen heard from a "friend" about the Division's performance at Kasserine Pass. Amongst other things he told her:

"You must not pay attention to what those loose-tongued gossips have to say....it seems odd that Sheldon should have referred to the Division not having participated in what they call the "big battle," whatever that may be. Nevertheless, it is a matter of recorded history that the First Division came in as a unit and stopped the Boche break-through at Kasserine Valley with a vigorous, well-timed, coordinated attack on February 22nd (Washington's birthday), at which time, strange to say, it was cooperating with a British unit. During that particular worrisome stage, I was commanding the French Constantine Division as well as the First Division, and remained in command of both these units until the Boche withdrawal from that sector had started. It has been said that the timely counterattack of the First Division precipitated this withdrawal...

....Maybe Chick Sheldon saw this battle in the cafes of Algiers and Constantine, which we have never seen. At any rate, George Patton can tell you and we ourselves in the First Division know that this is the only American unit that has consistently licked the Germans and shall continue to do so....I have always been the victim of gossip of small-minded people and it worries me very little, but I do get worried when such people go out of their way to make assertions concerning this Division. The British newspaper correspondents tell me that the Division received the thanks of the King of England when it stopped the tank and infantry attacks of the German Panzer Division and thus relieved the pressure for the British 8th Army.....

.....Frankly, we expect the Division to continue to be very busy until Rommel has definitely been "Dunkirked" out of North Africa. Losses do occur as one cannot make an omelet without breaking an egg, but with the intense training that the Division has had and the battle wisdom that we are acquiring, they have learned to ‘dish it out' with the least damage to themselves and the maximum damage to the enemy and have learned to ‘take it' with the tenacity of a bulldog..."

In mid-April Terry Allen flew up to Algiers with General Eisenhower and his staff to meet with British Generals Montgomery and Alexander. Their purpose was to ensure American involvement in the final push for victory in Tunisia.

Patton and Bradley were told a few days earlier that II Corps would play a minor role in the push to the sea. Not at all happy with this, General Eisenhower was determined to diplomatically invoke the involvement of both the 1st Infantry and the 9th Division in taking Bizerte, even though it meant the Americans would have to fight over miserably hilly, difficult terrain.

During the meeting, Eisenhower explained the mood on the home front in the US to the British commanders. He told them that most Americans didn't fully understand why their boys were in Africa and President Roosevelt still had to deal with the belief our forces should be throwing everything we had at the Japanese. He firmly, but diplomatically admonished Montgomery, telling him if the American people didn't feel our troops played a substantial part in forcing Rommel into the sea, Roosevelt would have a difficult problem continuing to sell the public on the strategy of taking Germany first and Japan later. He also reminded Montgomery that it was American supply, particularly Sherman tanks, which were equipping the British armies.

Montgomery pondered his commander's points and then, according to an entry in Harry Butcher’s diary, "readily acceded to the suggestion." Within days, American troops were given their own front, a one hundred fifty-mile line on the left side of the Tine Valley. The Germans had hurriedly fortified the mountains surrounding this valley. The area assigned to the 1st Division was dubbed "Mousetrap Alley." The planned order of battle would lead to the Plains of Mateur, across treacherous hills, forcing direct frontal attacks against Germans who had been told to fight to the last man.

Prior to this meeting, General Eisenhower made the decision to pull George Patton out of Tunisia and to bring him back to Casablanca in order to finish planning for the upcoming Sicilian invasion. On April 15th, orders were quietly issued placing General Omar Bradley in command of II Corps. These orders were initially kept from the censors and the troops because Eisenhower was concerned that the changes from Frendendall to Patton to Bradley would give rise to a feeling amongst the troops that they had done badly and their commander was paying the penalty. There was also a second, very important reason. Given recent victories under Patton's command, Eisenhower wanted the Germans to think the feared American general was still in Tunisia.

Patton's forty-two day command in Tunisia, according to Bradley, "Had gained him much notoriety, contributing to his growing legend, but it had not been his finest hour. He had been thrust into Fredendall's job with no warning and had to make due with Fredendall's staff. He had restored discipline to the corps and to a large extent, its self-confidence." Despite the routing of the Germans by the Fighting First at El Guettar, Bradley analytically pointed out, "For all Patton's bravado, the American GI had yet to prove himself in combat. There had been isolated noteworthy achievements and acts of valor, but on the whole we had merely learned to walk."

Patton had certainly provided an excellent example to the troops. Both he and Bradley were at the front when the 1st Division jumped off at El Guettar. Bradley vividly recalled one of the actions in the 1st Infantry zone: "The slugging advance of Allen's infantry had alerted the Axis and attracted very heavy enemy air attacks. A flight of twin-engine Junker bombers hit our observation command post, and for the second time in Tunisia I was very nearly killed. We took cover in slit trenches, but the heavy bombing blasts killed three men, including Patton's aide, Richard N. Jenson."

After Patton's relief of command, he was invited to dinner at Eisenhower's headquarters. According to Butcher, they talked about "toughness" and running an effective Army, being "utterly ruthless, even to their best friends." Patton pointed out, "The troops had a right to good leadership, and it was up to top commanders to relieve any officer who failed to provide it."

Eisenhower sat through all the bravado, and then Patton started reminiscing about his last day at II Corps headquarters. He told the General he had taken time to pick some wild flowers and to place them on the grave of Richard Jensen. Harry Butcher, who was present at the dinner, observed, "As he recalled the incident, he said: ‘I guess I really am a goddam old fool.’ Then, his voice quivered and tears started running down his cheeks."

Eisenhower went to bed early that evening, but Butcher and Patton sat up to talk. Patton, while reluctant he could not stay at the front, seemed to find comfort in the fact that he was doing his job and said, "He was satisfied if Ike was satisfied." There was a phone message the next morning that came through Washington from Army Chief of Staff Marshall, essentially telling Patton, "You have done a fine job and have justified our confidence in you." When Patton was told of this, he turned to Eisenhower and said emotionally, "I owe this to you Ike." The Allied Commander's quick response was, "The hell you do."

Back on the battlefield, the final push for Tunisia was set to go. Overall Allied Ground Force Commander, Harold Alexander, penned the directive for the offensive with the following order:

SOLDIERS OF THE ALLIES

s/ H.R. Alexander

Commanding

The next day, a fully invigorated and determined Terry Allen sent this heartfelt letter home to Mary Fran:

April 22, 1943

Mary Fran - Dearest,

We have been moving and fighting again. Our few days of rest after the Battle of El Guettar were not long, in fact we had only a three-day rest.

During the time, I got up to Algiers by plane to see Eisenhower, so the rest period did not do me too much good. We are now operating in close cooperation with the British high command. This mixed army of ours all seems sort of bizarre.

George Patton has left us to take over some other job in another sector. The First Division is "carrying the ball" again and is leading the American effort....

We are sitting in an old busted farmhouse, writing by candlelight. The Division is jumping off in the big attack in the morning and I'm hoping and praying that my scheme of maneuvers is OK. We've won 8 times in a row now. The strain is rather tough and I'll be glad when this mess is over.

All my love, sweetheart. I love you very dearly and miss you and Sonny terribly. I never appreciated before what you both mean to me. Pray for the Division, dear. They need it.

I love you Sweetheart,

Yours,

Terry

On Friday, April 23rd General Eisenhower flew aboard his Flying Fortress into Algiers and then jeeped his way to II Corps headquarters in a wooded ravine near a farmhouse to meet with Bradley. General Bradley updated his boss on how the American attacks were going and, later in the afternoon, took Eisenhower over to the Command Post of the 1st Infantry Division on the Beja-Mateur road. Bradley described Terry Allen's quarters as a "barnyard piled high with steaming manure." They found him talking to his officers about a dawn attack scheduled for the following morning.

Allen stopped his briefing to update Eisenhower on the battlefield actions. At 4:00 AM that morning combat teams of the 18th Infantry had jumped off in a simultaneous strike northward with the 26th and 16th Infantries on their left. He told the General he had given the troops the word they must win the final victory in two weeks at all costs. Shrugging his shoulders, he also said, "The damn rain started again, as it always does when the 1st Division goes into battle in North Africa."

Allen then went on to describe the push of the 18th Infantry at two locations. He showed Eisenhower a battlefield map marking Hills 273, 409 and 350. The numeric names for the hills represented their height in meters. He explained the Third Battalion had quickly taken Hill 273 but then were bogged down on Hill 409, where the hillside terrain had gentle slopes on one side with what looked like normal Arab thatch and stone huts near the top.

Allen vividly described that as one company advanced towards the huts around sunrise that morning, they were taken by surprise. Suddenly, the huts had opened up and out came machine gun fire, followed by mortar rounds and other weaponry the Germans had hidden inside these huts for a surprise attack. The 1st’s commander reluctantly reported that the men of the leading company, L Company, had been caught hopelessly off guard and, after being pinned down all day by machine gun fire, backed off the hill. Shaking his head, Allen quietly reported 17 men were killed, 25 had been seriously wounded, another 48 had received lesser wounds and at least that many were still missing.

Eisenhower expressed his concern for the men and then quickly asked Allen about Hill 350. Allen told the General the first news from that location was equally dismal and early reports indicated the Germans had really dug in. "But," he explained with pride, "As the day wore on, things in the Second Battalion zone had vastly improved."

Pfc. Baummer and the rest of the Second Battalion had been ordered into the vicinity of Hill 350 on the evening of April 21st. The hill itself was a dominating feature, one of the highest in a chain of mountains running squarely down the center of the Tine Valley. Reconnaissance patrols had learned that the Germans had heavily fortified the back slope of the hill and another enemy reserve unit was established on yet another hill immediately behind 350. Looking straight at the mountain mass from the Second Battalion's camp, there were large open fields past an immediate knoll at the foot of Hill 350. This knoll was marked on the battlefield maps as Pimple Hill and it was adjacent to a cultivated tract of land near Windmill Farm. Again, the Germans had the high ground advantage and were using it.

Pfc. Baummer spent all of April 22nd waiting for the planned attack at 4:00 AM the following morning. The Second Battalion had relieved the Scottish Blackwatch Regiment the day before and found itself in an area totally devoid of cover. The Germans had outposts in the hills on both flanks of the Second Battalion's camp. During the day, according to After Action Reports, "The Battalion was under almost continuous artillery and mortar fire."

Nevertheless, Lt. Colonel Ben Sternberg laid out the plan of attack for the 23rd. The Battalion Commander called for an hour of artillery preparations prior to jumping off. Company E was to then move up the valley and come up the hill from the northeast. Company G would spiritedly advance over Pimple Hill and then attack Windmill Farm. After cleaning out the enemy at this outpost, Company G would then quickly move over to assist Company E in taking out the main German positions on Hill 350.

Sternberg ordered Captain Murphy and Company H to support the attack from positions that were occupied after darkness fell. Murphy didn't like the idea of waiting out the 23rd until then, but at least he had an order to get into the thick of things. Company F was told that it would not leave the line of departure and attack at all. Instead, the men were ordered to remain in a reserve position and to be prepared only if they were needed.

During the early part of the evening of the 22nd, Sternberg reconsidered his plan and decided to send out a reinforced platoon from Company G to capture Pimple Hill. At 10:30, troops under the command of Lieutenant Gordon Jeffries quickly took the hill and established an outpost that afforded excellent positioning for mortar and artillery preparations that would be used in the main assault on Windmill Farm. An artillery barrage was laid into Hill 350 as planned at 3:00 AM on the morning of April 23, 1943. Company G jumped off an hour later, made a spectacular bayonet charge on Windmill Farm, and drove the enemy from this position. But, the Germans had hidden some of their forces behind the walls of the farm and they suddenly emerged from two flank positions and counterattacked. From his location at the bottom of the hill, Pfc. Baummer could hear the sickening sounds of the fire exchanges that resulted in the slaughter of nearly half of the company before the sun even rose on Pimple Hill. The battered survivors retreated and the Germans reoccupied Windmill Farm.

Meanwhile, Captain Carl Randall led Company E in from the northeast and in the darkness of night had taken the Germans completely by surprise. Randall's men captured 35 prisoners as the enemy backed off and, for a few fleeting moments, Hill 350 belonged to the Second Battalion. But Randall’s men had no time to dig in and establish any defensive positions before daylight broke.

Too quickly, the Germans sent in reinforcements from their positions directly behind Hill 350. At the same time, the forces that beat off Company G at Windmill Farm advanced on Randall's riflemen. Standing firm, Company E vigorously defended their ground against overwhelming odds. But within minutes, Randall was hit and seriously wounded and 40 percent of his company was wiped out. In a rapid retreat, Randall was saved by his men, as they carried him off the hill back to their earlier line of departure.

Colonel Sternberg pondered his options and decided to strike back late in the morning. At 11:15 he ordered Hill 350 to be peppered with forty-five minutes of artillery fire, while simultaneously calling for the immediate support of light tanks. Sternberg then ordered Company F, the infantrymen who thought they would sit the engagement out, to make the same attack Randall's company had started at 4:00 AM. Sternberg then hurriedly ordered Captain Murphy and his men of H Company to rush up to Pimple Hill and provide cover for Company F's advance.

Pfc. Baummer joined the rest of his buddies and charged into position. Company F moved out and was immediately met with intense mortar, artillery and machine gun fire from the Germans. But, by this time, the men of Company H had already started slamming these forces with everything they had.

The terrifying 81-mm. infantry mortar was a very effective weapon during the Second World War. Designed to be fired from a smooth three inch bore-barrel attached to a steel baseplate, it was then up to the individual soldier to determine the best angle for the projectile to be fired so it would land and explode in the target area. The mortar itself had a teardrop shape with fins at its tail. When it hit the ground and erupted, its splinters scattered in a lethal circle of about fifteen feet - an area quite capable of killing or seriously wounding several soldiers.

Both the Germans and the men of Company H were using 81-mm. mortar rounds against each other on Hill 350. The infantrymen of H Company also carried several types of Browning machine guns up Pimple Hill on April 23rd. The majority of them were .30 caliber weapons with 250 shots to a cartridge. The machine gun was capable of firing at the rate of 500 rounds per minute and was accurate in hitting its targets from as far way as a thousand yards.

These weapons were not necessarily easy to use. Some of the machine guns were water-cooled and the barrels would overheat when a large number of cartridge rounds were fed through them. During intense combat, soldiers would often rotate barrels, removing the hot ones and quickly replacing them with a cool, spare barrel.

Shooting off mortar rounds took both experience and courage. One by one, a mortar was fed into the top of the barrel. When it hit the bottom, it was initially lifted by a charge containing smokeless powder. As it roared up the barrel, a secondary charge fixed around the fins in cloth bags would then ignite and the mortar would loudly shoot off towards its target.

With F Company in bad need of immediate cover, Captain Murphy ordered Company H to keep letting go with everything the men had. In what Colonel Sternberg called in his After Action report "superb supporting fire" during the course of its mission on April 23, 1943, Pfc. Baummer and his brothers in arms expended 92,000 rounds of machine gun ammunition and 1,200 rounds of 81-mm. mortar. Under the cover of H Company's barrage, Company F made a "beautifully executed advance that never faltered," according to Sternberg’s observations, and with the excellent support of the tanks, Hill 350 was recaptured by mid-afternoon. The absolutely terrified Germans charged off the hill, never counterattacked and began a general withdrawal from the valley two days later.

Eisenhower listened to Allen's description of these actions and told him to write it up. Within a matter of a few short weeks, Allen's report passed through channels, back to Washington and onto the desk of the President of the United States. For its unprecedented actions on Hill 350, the Second Battalion received a Presidential Distinguished Unit Citation.

Second Battalion

Beja, Tunisia

23 April, 1943

"At H-Hour on 23 April 1943, in the vicinity of Beja, Tunisia, the Second Battalion launched an attack on Hill 350. It was vitally important to the entire offensive that this hill be taken to provide a route to the plains of Mateur for the armored forces. Under an umbrella of heavy artillery fire, superior enemy forces launched a powerful and determined counter-attack, driving the Second Battalion from its newly won objective. Undaunted by this initial setback, this task force, although weakened by severe losses, displayed unexcelled courage and prowess in arms by regrouping and again assaulting the important hill. The battle raged fiercely, but ultimately the enemy was driven from his position and Hill 350 was again occupied by this organization. The Second Battalion was the only one in the entire sector to take its objective on that day. The conspicuous aggressiveness, valor, extraordinary heroism and profound devotion to duty displayed by this Battalion insured the successful occupation of this vital terrain feature. The eminently significant accomplishment of this gallant and cohesive fighting force was instrumental in broaching the entire defensive system in this sector, enabling the entire II Corps to advance uninterruptedly until capitulation of the Axis forces in Tunisia was achieved."

War correspondent Ernie Pyle was in the 1st Infantry Division zone during the Battle for Hill 350. He described the actions, which were subsequently printed in newspaper columns back in America, as follows:

"The Germans lay on the back slope of every ridge, deeply dug into foxholes. In front of them the fields and pastures were hideous with thousands of hidden mines. The forward slopes were left open, untenanted, and if the Americans had tried to scale those slopes they would have been murdered wholesale in an inferno of machine gun crossfire, plus mortars and grenades. Consequently, we didn't do it that way. We fell back to the old warfare of first pulverizing the enemy with artillery, then sweeping around the ends of the hill with infantry and taking them from the sides and the rear. It was tough fighting, and it was slow fighting; but the 1st handled it well."

The cost for Hill 350 was enormous. 43 Second Battalion infantrymen were killed, 161 were wounded and 20 more were reported missing. The Second Battalion lost nearly a third of its strength on Hill 350.

To underscore the bravery of the men during their actions that day, Colonel Greer personally wrote a letter to the mother of one of the soldiers who lost his life. He said:

Other battles raged fiercely across the "Mousetrap" throughout April 23^rd and the 24th. The Third Battalion was ordered to reinforce the First Battalion on nearby Hill 409. After bitter encounters that included a missile attack launched by the Germans from over ten miles away, the Third Battalion finally succeeded in capturing the hill which had been camouflaged by Arab huts and hidden German machine gun nests. The Battalion was finally pulled out of the line and there were unofficial reports its commander wept when he got the casualty reports for Hill 409. In addition to the casualties on the 24th, most of the 48 men who were reported missing the day before were found dead.

The night of April 24th was one of the darkest evenings of the new offensive. It was so dark patrols were called off because compasses could not even be seen. By daybreak however, reconnaissance personnel could see the elaborately planned minefield layouts on Hills 350 and 409. Live trip-wires were strung like weeds across the hills. There were teller mines and many, deadly "bouncing babies," which the troops also called "castrators." A complete trench system had been dug in by the Germans for their defense of Hill 409 and high outposts were erected to spot the oncoming Allied forces.

The Germans continued retreating after the fighting of April 23rd through the 25th and took up new positions on the steep and rocky hills several miles back. Word came down from the 1st Infantry command post, which a war correspondent by now had nicknamed "Danger Forward," saying the German supply lines coming in from Sicily were fortunately being held back. German ships were being regularly attacked and frequently sunk due to the effectiveness of Allied naval support in the Mediterranean.

When they fell back on air transports to move troops into Tunisia, the Germans were met with equal combat efficiency by nearly 3,000 Allied airplanes. On April 23rd, the same day the Second Battalion earned their Presidential Unit Citation on Hill 350, the Germans rushed twenty-one large six-engine air transports into Tunisia. Each was capable of carrying 120 troops, but they were all shot down by Allied fighters over the Bay of Tunis. However, the remaining Germans in Tunisia were the elite of the Nazi and Italian fighting forces and battle-hardened from months in the desert. They were not going to be defeated easily.

General Bradley usually left the details of achieving each combat team's orders up to their individual commanders. Knowing the hillsides had to be cleared before armor could advance, he previously warned his generals to stay off of main roads and the floor of the valley and to take the high ground first. Bradley noted in his memoirs, "Our infantry proceeded cautiously, but steadily along the entire front. It was a tough fight every yard of the way and our casualties, especially in Terry Allen's 1st Division, were not light. As we moved forward, rooting the fanatical enemy out of the high ground, they fell back slowly and methodically, shrinking their lines and digging in again on higher ground. Everywhere in their retreat, they laid enormous numbers of land mines. We found 600 in one area that was only 50 by 100 feet."

Danger at the front lines was underscored by the tragic wounding of the head of the War Department's ground force operations. While visiting from Washington, Lieutenant General "Whitey" McNair received head and shoulder wounds in the 1st Division zone. Despite these dangers, it did not stop Omar Bradley's style of command during the final thrust for Tunisia. The general visited each regimental command post on a daily basis and, according to his memoirs, he "usually went up to the front with him to study the terrain and enemy positions firsthand, to show the GIs that their commander was no rear-echelon tent hog."

On the day after Easter Sunday, the despised Hermann Goering Division was observed in a heavily fortified position atop a rugged peak named Hill 609. It was the highest in the whole terrain of the II Corps sector. It dominated the 1st Division's routes to the east, making them impassable because of dangers to its left flank, where the 18th Infantry and Pfc. Baummer were bogged down. From here he could see the ridges of the high brown hill as it rose to a flat, dusty top where the Germans were held up in what looked like an impregnable stronghold. But the enemy was now fighting with the sea closer to its back, for Pfc. Baummer could also make out the rise of the towers of Mateur only ten miles away near the edge of the Mediterranean.

With the 1st Infantry held up in its advance near the edge of Hill 609, Bradley decided to use some tactical maneuvers not found in the Army’s doctrines to surprise the Germans. He ordered the commander of the 34th Division, General Charles W."Doc" Ryder, to "Get me that hill." Bradley knew the 34th had been battered throughout North Africa and wanted to restore their confidence. Adding to his simple directive to take the prominent position, Bradley said, "And no one will ever again doubt the toughness of your division."

As Bradley put it, "This was no easy task. Ryder drew up his plans with care and launched his attack. He painstakingly pried the enemy out of the lower hills, then with the help of a massive artillery barrage, they assaulted 609. Once, twice, thrice, his troops bravely stormed the peaks only to fail. I then proposed a novel suggestion: tanks employed as mobile artillery. It was novel because to my knowledge, no one had ever attempted to storm an objective like 609 with tanks."

Bradley met Terry Allen and British ground force commander Kenneth Anderson at the 1st Division command post later the same day. He outlined the plan for his surprise attack and pointed out to Anderson that the 1st Division had been shot up by fire from Hill 609 on the north. Bradley went on to explain how important it was to take the hill first so the 1st Division could then open up the valley.

Terry Allen simply grunted in assent. According to Bradley, "The impact of the artillery fire on Hill 609 and its neighboring hills had splashed into the spines of those djbels (hills) on which the 1st had advanced, showering the troops with shell fragments and sharp slivers of stone. Many of Terry's rifle companies had already been cut down to the size of platoons."

Later that day, a weary General Allen brought Mary Fran up to date. Writing from his command post in an old Arab stable...

My dear Mary Fran,

We have been in the line again for the past six days and, frankly, the Division has been having one hell of a battle. Cannot say exactly what we are doing, but we are acting in cooperation with the British and are closing in for the "kill." The Division is carrying the brunt of the American effort and has hard going. We are fighting the best German soldiers that Rommel has and have made our way inch by inch through very desperate resistance. It has been a slugging match so far and one or the other has to break before too long. You may be assured it will not be the First Division...

Went to church on Easter Sunday. Strange to say one of our regimental Catholic chaplains said mass at 4:00 PM behind the front lines. Airplanes were flying overhead and our artillery was firing behind the next hill, 100 yards away.......

All my love,

Terry

"On the morning of April 30," Bradley remembered, "Ryder's Infantry, reinforced by seventeen tanks, once more stormed Hill 609. The tanks, approaching on the flank and from the rear, slammed shell after shell at the enemy positions. By afternoon, Ryder's men had captured the summit. During that night and the following day, May 1st, they fended off several counterattacks, and finally at nightfall the enemy gave up and withdrew."

Bradley's risk in using armor for the attack on 609 was well rewarded. Even the Germans admitted his tactics were the key to their loss of the hill. One of their captured prisoners had even gone so far as to say the use of tanks was "unfair."

Following the clearing of Hill 609, the paths to the east were now opened up. This allowed the 1st Infantry to advance up the northern rim of the "Mousetrap," opening the valley for the armored divisions and, according to Bradley, "a fast punch through to Mateur." However, the enemy was not going to give this simply. It was learned that the Navy sank three German transport ships, enroute from Sicily with ammunition, to the bottom of the sea. Two destroyers with over 3200 German replacements were also attacked. One went to the floor of the Mediterranean and the other was seen by first hand observers "burning from stem to stern."

Meanwhile, Bradley drew up plans for the final co-ordinated offensive to force the German surrender. Now freed from the bonds of the hills of North Africa, an attack could be launched at the last enemy defensive positions on the plains. Bradley's plan called for the 1st Infantry to follow in behind the tank breakout and sweep up the last of Rommel's forces.

As the storm gathered for the attack, convoys of trucks, tanks, light artillery, jeeps and tractors towing larger artillery pieces clogged the roadways leading to Mateur. Pfc. Baummer, choking in the dense dust raised by this heavy traffic, was forced off to the side of the roadway with the rest of Company H. The atmosphere was one of eeriness. It was easy for him to imagine the campaign was nearing the end. Looking through breaks in the clouds of dust, he saw fields of brightly colored red and orange poppies at the base of the mountains to either side of the valley. The sea and victory were now just a few miles beyond this picturesque view.

Yet his thoughts were also on his buddy, Eddie Alff. Eddie was one of the original guys left in Company H. He took a bad hit to the head on April 30th and was still unconscious. The medics were working on a wound near the left side of his brain and supposedly he was never going to be able to see out of one eye again. He was a good man, but the war was probably over for him. There was good reason to be concerned for Eddie Alff. He ended up with a plate in his head and became blind in his left eye. The medics never could remove one piece of shrapnel from his head. He lived, but he ended up with tinnitus and a life-long curse of bad dreams and insomnia.

General Bradley's plan called for one more thrust by the badly battered 1st Infantry Division. Company H was now down to fewer than fifty men, but there was no time for reinforcements to be added to the line. German bombing increased across the plains of Mateur and their "88" shellings plainly told the weary infantry soldiers of the 18th that this war was not over yet.

On May 6th, the entire British and American front, according to Bradley, "jumped off with murderous artillery and close air support causing the Axis forces to reel back in stunned confusion." "Doc" Ryder's 34th Division was assigned to a difficult crossover maneuver with the 1st Infantry Division, a move that found the 18th's Third Battalion in one of the most grueling and costly engagements of the entire campaign.

Terry Allen ordered the Battalion into a pre-dawn attack across a shallow river basin. The men marched into a trap of German "88's" and Companies I and K were caught in crossfire and cut to pieces near the final protective line the Nazis had drawn in the sand. Both of these companies suffered crippling losses, killing the captain of one company and two of his lieutenants. Company A of the First Battalion was ordered in to reinforce the remaining companies of the Third Battalion, but the men were quickly trapped in a gully and its captain surrendered himself and several other men rather than face certain massacre.

General Allen soon ordered the Second Battalion to throw itself into this devastating conflict. The first company, Company F, went in supported by five medium tanks. They were following the infantry on a causeway crossing the river leading into the zone. Suddenly the causeway collapsed under the weight of the tanks, leaving F Company unprotected. In a mass of confusion and chaos, the Second Battalion was immediately ordered to retreat and by dusk what remained of the 1st Infantry Division was back at their early morning line of departure.

It was one of the worst days of the campaign for Terry Allen and his men. The 18th had been up against the elite Barenthin Regiment, the same unit who held out on Hill 609 for so long. According to Bradley, "In esprit, intelligence and tenacity it surpassed every other Axis unit on our front."

But fate allowed Pfc. Baummer to be spared again. Company H would have followed F Company behind the armor lost to the river basin when the causeway caved in. Instead, he was held up on a ridge, witnessing most of the actions from this reserve position where the whine of artillery fire and the thunder of passing bombers kept him on edge all day long. He saw American tanks and artillery dominating the enemy just a thousand yards away. Nearby, German armor burst into orange flames, sending puffs of dark smoke into the sky.

There were also reports revealing that the enemy was running out of ammunition and, for some reason, many of the artillery shells that fell on the battlefields did not explode. One of the officers in Company K reported about forty of the 88-mm. shells that the enemy fired into the Third Battalion command post turned out to be duds. Pfc. Baummer also heard the Germans were out of gasoline and could not refuel their mobile equipment.

On Friday May 7th, the 18th Infantry maintained its defensive position near the point they jumped off from the day before. Thrashing German "88's" laid fire on the Division throughout the day in their final attempts to fight to the last man. But, the 1st's orders were to simply "hold the line" on May 7th, for the high command knew the end was near.

During the afternoon, after a briefing at II Corps command post with Bradley, General Eisenhower again came to the 1st Infantry Division headquarters to get a first-hand report from Terry Allen. Having been up for most of the night near the front lines, Allen was roused from his sleep in order to tell his story to the Commanding General. Barely intelligible, Allen gave his report to Eisenhower in what Harry Butcher called "monosyllabic monotones." He reluctantly revealed more of his companies were reduced to the size of platoons and casualties amongst the combat troops remained extremely high. Allen said, "The men are tired, they have been attacking almost daily for weeks."

On Saturday, May 8th Eisenhower received a message intercepted from a German wireless transmission. It contained the "good-byes" of the 15th Panzer Division to the homeland. A transmission hours later revealed the Germans had developed a plan to evacuate over 60,000 Nazi and Italian troops.

Finally on the 9th, German commander von Arnim ran up the white flag, and over 250,000 Axis personnel laid down their arms and were eventually led to prisoner of war camps. About 40,000 of these surrendered to II Corps and, as General Bradley remembered, "No single incident of the war brought me more satisfaction, indeed elation, than that long procession of abject Axis POW's." During the afternoon Bradley took immense pride in drafting a two word cable to his commanding officer. With characteristic understatement, it simply read "Mission Accomplished."

In a letter to Terry Allen, Jr. on May 10th, the General told Sonny about the fate of the First Division during the last days of the campaign and, as always, provided his boy with something special to remember the war.

"....The casualties have been severe, but the casualties we inflicted on the Germans were far more severe. In fact, many German prisoners have testified that the effectiveness of the 1st Division artillery fire and the tenacity of our infantry was far worse than they encountered in Russia or elsewhere....I sent you by mail a shell case from a projectile fired from a German tank in the 18th Infantry sector at El Guettar. It was still smoking when picked up and I thought you might like it as a souvenir..."

The end of the long and bitter North African campaign brought with it joy, triumph, elation and at the same time sadness and headaches. What had been expected to be a twenty-eight day campaign had actually taken six months. Pfc. Baummer and the 18th Infantry were in contact with the enemy for 115 of the 125 days of this proving ground offensive against the Germans.

Yet, by skill and luck, he survived the first American offensive against the Germans unscathed. Tired and worn, he welcomed rest. The 18th Infantry briefly regrouped near Beja while awaiting its next set of orders. Rumors spread in Company H leading the men to believe their next destination was Greece. During the last few days of the campaign, several men from companies of the 18th captured at Kasserine Pass rejoined the unit. Word spread around revealing the entire battalion of the 16th taken during the same battles was also freed from POW cages when American planes intimidated the ship they were being transported to Italy on. The vessel was abandoned by its Italian crew and, after it grounded on a sandbar, every man in the Battalion escaped and marched back to join their regiment.

General Eisenhower called a press conference within a few days to report on the end of the North African offensive. He announced that General Omar Bradley was actually in command of II Corps during the final thrust and he had relieved "the best armored-force officer in the Army, George Patton, so that he could devote his energies to future offensives." He explained Bradley's infantry background to the reporters. Ernie Pyle became so impressed with Bradley that he eventually wrote six columns about the unassuming general to his readers at home.

The Supreme Commander told the reporters, "Last minute farewell messages sent in the clear from German radio operators in Tunisia to the homeland were described by British intelligence officers as `crude and gross.'" He said both Hitler and Italian Dictator Mussolini sent messages "glowing with praise for the valiant fight of the Axis." Eisenhower paid tribute to all of his commanders and the troops and cited the victory as an example of "Allied co-operation at its best." When a reporter asked him what he regarded as the most critical period in the campaign, he said, "From Christmas through January." Off the record, he talked about the capture of German commander von Arnim and said he and other captured enemy generals would be "promptly flown to England for expert examination and then sent to America, as will most of the German prisoners."

Eisenhower then revealed the War Office had intercepted von Arnim's last message to his homeland. With a broad grin, he looked down and read "I report the order to defend Tunisia to the last cartridge has been carried out. Signed Arnim." When he looked up, the reporters were on their chairs and cheering.

The haughty arrogance of the once-mighty Afrika Corps was now humbled. A colonel at II Corps headquarters even said the German and Italian prisoners of war were placed in separate barbed-wire enclosures because of the strong animosity they showed towards one another. This same officer reported that the personnel of the German ground forces and the Luftwaffe "obviously do not fraternize" and showed bitterness towards each other because the ground troops felt their air support had failed them.

The Invasion of North Africa yielded important dividends. In addition to the quarter of a million enemy soldiers captured, Hitler lost over 150,000 men from some of his best divisions during the final battles. The loss of this southern-flank protection on the shores of North Africa broke the spirit of his Italian allies who had every reason to believe they were next. Hitler may have succeeded in delaying a new offensive in the Mediterranean by several months, but the Allies also used the time to build up supplies and troops in England for the planned future attack across Western Europe.

There was also a substantial turnaround in the Battle for the Atlantic during Operation Torch. Before the Invasion, German submarines sank millions of tons of Allied ships, most of which were bound for England or the Mediterranean. But, by the end of the North African offensive, the Allies gained the upper hand over the U-boats. Due to continued perfection in the British invention of radar, surface vessels could spot the dreaded submarines before they could sight Allied ships. With the advantage of this new technology, American destroyers could accurately pinpoint, ambush and destroy the German vessels before they could get near Allied convoys.

By mid-1943 the Atlantic had been divided into two zones, which made the task of hunting down U-boats easier. The British and Canadian Navies became responsible for guarding the North Atlantic convoys, while the US Navy protected fleet movements through the Mediterranean and North Africa. Allied loses in the North Atlantic fell by 50 percent during the final push in Tunisia, while the Germans saw their U-boats sinkings increase five-fold. By the time of the cease fire in North Africa, the Germans lost forty submarines - half their normal operational strength on the Atlantic. Hitler's Naval Commander, Admiral Karl Doenitz, withdrew his remaining submarines and, for the moment, the dreaded U-boats ceased to be a menace. Germany's first line of defense - the Atlantic Ocean - was now in Allied control.

Operation Torch also provided a valuable testing ground for amphibious landing operations. All of the original goals for the Invasion were achieved. The Mediterranean was now in effective control of the Allies and its vital shipping lanes could be opened up to the oil supplies in Libya and Egypt. The Germans were forced out of North Africa after nearly a million casualties since they first set foot on the sands of the continent in 1940. They also lost 8,000 aircraft, 6,000 guns, 70,000 trucks and 2,400,000 tons of shipping. The Allies also gained important, unchallenged land and air bases for staging the next assault.

Omar Bradley's final comments on this first Anglo-American offensive stated, "The Invasion of North Africa had been a British concept reluctantly undertaken by Marshall and Ike. On reflection, I came to the conclusion that it was fortunate that the British view prevailed, that the US Army first met the enemy on the periphery, in Africa rather than on the beaches of France. In Africa we learned to crawl, to walk - then run."

North Africa was a miracle in survival for Pfc. Robert A. Baummer. The taste of battle made the young, twenty-two year old a hardened veteran in a Division which was quickly becoming recognized as one of history's finest fighting formations - shock troops, an assault division which would always, as Teddy Roosevelt put it, "march to the sounds of the guns."

At home on 90 Oak Street in Naugatuck, Connecticut, Pfc. Baummer's mother followed the North African campaign by reading papers and magazines and listening to radio reports. The Army never published casualty figures and only a few pictures of dead American boys ever appeared in print. Even then, the bodies were shown, according to one account "fully clothed and intact, as if they were sleeping." President Roosevelt, through the Office of War Information, had led the effort to sanitize the war experience, so that few people on the home front understood what war was all about.

But, on May 13th, Pfc. Baummer's mother was thoroughly delighted when she read Ernie Pyle's column in the local paper. Viola was sick of hearing stories about the determination of the American soldier in North Africa. She knew her boy's spirit and never accepted the thought that he wasn't giving the Germans his very best efforts. Good old Ernie Pyle, who was in the line of fire with the Division and would know, wrote:

"Nobody will care to underrate the American contribution to the end of Rommel in North Africa. My time at the front was with a certain unit of the 1st Infantry Division. This division has been through a half dozen big battles in North Africa and has made a good name for itself in every one of them. But, it has paid dearly for its victories.

Apparently there have been some intimations in print back home that the 1st Division did not fight well in earlier battles. The men of the Division all are sore as hornets about it. If such a thing were printed, it was somebody's unfortunate mistake. For the 1st Division has always fought well.

It is natural to be loyal to your friends and I feel a loyalty to the 1st Division, for I have lived with it off and on for six months. But it is a sad thing to become loyal to the men of a division because the men go, and the new ones come until at last only their famous number "1" is left. The 1st Division may last forever, but my friends of today may not.

For you at home who think this war has been small stuff, let me tell you just one thing - the 1st Division has done more fighting here than it did throughout the last war."

The popular columnist could not say where he was because of censorship, so none of his readers would obviously be able to tell. But, he was with the 18th Infantry when he wrote the column published on the 13th of May. Viola finished Ernie Pyle's column, read it twice more, called all of her sisters and friends, then cut it out to send to Bobby. She went to bed that night, like she and millions of other mothers all across America with sons in the war did every night, praying the postman would not knock on her door the next day with a notification telegram from the Army.

In Institute, West Virginia, Pfc. Baummer's brother Edwin was doing his job. The critical gap in rubber supply had been curtailed. In 1940, at the time Edwin started working, synthetic rubber plants were meeting just one-fiftieth of the Army's needs. The Atlantic Monthly wrote in 1943, "Our very national existence was at the mercy of a dwindling stockpile, but the production of synthetic rubber had turned the corner." Eighty-three percent of new rubber supplies produced that year came from synthetic rubber factories like the US Rubber plant at Institute, West Virginia. Edwin's occupational deferment was paying dividends to the war effort, where workers he supervised were turning out the tires that moved the Army.

During the summer after the end of the Tunisian campaign, Pfc. Baummer wrote a letter back home to his mother from "somewhere in Sicily." Only a part of it survived the years. However, it revealed the sadness of a young hero, far from home:

"....I received a couple of letters from Gram yesterday, and she informed me that George Walker was killed in North Africa, and of course it didn't sound very good to hear that. I guess that I shall have to settle the score for him when I get the chance. I never did see much of him after he joined the Army, but I did meet up with him in England when we were there and it was the same old Walker, still crazy as ever and I am sorry to hear what happened to him...."

Technical Sergeant George Walker was Bob's closest boyhood friend from home in Naugatuck. George and Bob played together as kids and got into trouble as young teenagers with their BB guns before fate led both of them into the Army. George had also enlisted in the 1st Division, but he ended up in artillery, while Bob trained to become a slugging foot soldier. Bob and George were still close, much closer than either of them could have possibly known on May 2, 1943. George's 7th Field Artillery battalion was assigned to the 1st Division as it was advancing up the Tine Valley, just a few miles away from Bob's position along the northern rim of the "Mousetrap." On May 2nd, one of the bloodiest days during the final push in North Africa, George A. Walker was killed in action while leading his men into a field, where the Germans had lines of fire aimed at his unit. A direct shell hit killed George instantly.

For one soldier, the loss of his best friend from childhood could mean only one thing. The day he read his grandmother's letter and learned of George's death was the day the war became very personal to Pfc. Robert A. Baummer.

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