"The result was the most arrogant, egotistical, selfish and

dangerous move in the whole combined operations of

World War II."

General Bradley

"Those astonishing Americans, they fight all day,

attack all night and shoot all the time."

Part of a letter found on a dead

German soldier

In early 1945, after years of listening to high-browed British bias about the fighting ability of American forces, Army Chief of Staff Marshall had heard enough. During a meeting with Harold Alexander in the presence of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Marshall took on the head of the Sicilian Allied Ground Operations after hearing yet another unbearable slur about US forces during a discussion about fighting spirit. Alexander had woven a condescending remark into a point he was making that essentially came out as, "Of course your troops are basically trained." Marshall was reported to have "replied glacially," saying much to the consternation of Winston Churchill, "Yes, American troops start out and make every possible mistake. But after the first time, they do not repeat their mistakes. The British troops start in the same way and continue making the mistakes over and over for a year." The atmosphere was suddenly so thick with tension that Churchill immediately moved the conversation in another direction.

Carlo D'Este summed up Alexander's attitude about American fighting ability during the Invasion of Sicily with a succinct observation that suggested, "His leadership was compounded by the mistaken conviction that American fighting ability was inferior to that of the British Army. Alexander refused to acknowledge that the US Army now fighting in Sicily bore no resemblance to the Army that had been humiliated at Kasserine a scant five months earlier."

This arrogant attitude was not a consistent British trait. Just before the Invasion, the Chief of the Imperial Staff, Field Marshall Alan Brooke acknowledged that the future of the war depended on the success of the Americans. Alexander's presumptuous attitude failed to take into consideration that he himself was also quite critical of the command capabilities of his own General Kenneth Anderson. Anderson was in charge of day-to-day tactical maneuvers during the battles at Kasserine Pass. At that time he had actually blamed Anderson for the Kasserine debacle, even saying, "he was not big enough for the job."

One would expect 1st Division commander Terry Allen would have something to say about this cavalier British attitude towards American fighting men and he most certainly did. After he received a report through Eisenhower's headquarters in Algiers about the performance of the 18th Infantry at the time they were under Anderson's command at Longstop Hill in North Africa, he visited Colonel Greer to find out first hand what had really happened. Greer's after-action reports, while not confrontational, were not very complimentary about the support he had received from the British Guards Brigade he was attached to. But privately he was seething and he told this to Terry Allen.

The 1st Infantry Division commander decided to pay a subsequent visit to the British corps commander in charge of the sector. He presented him with his own written report rebutting the earlier record about the 18th's performance during the dreadful Christmas massacres. After reading Allen's account, the corps commander's only response was, "I had accepted in good faith what he had earlier been told." Allen simply stared at him until his opposite number tried to break the tension by awkwardly responding, "I can't comment."

Allen then had two choices. He might have caused a scene which would risk breaching the delicate balance being forged during this early stage of the Anglo-American Alliance or he could attempt a more diplomatic approach. Allen decided to pursue the latter course of action. Despite the fact 347 1st Division soldiers were killed on Longstop Hill and Allen was determined to defend his fallen heroes, he took his report back from the corps commander and proceeded to rip it up in his presence. As General Allen was tearing his work apart, he glared at the British officer in front of him and, controlling himself as best he could, said, "Please tell General Alexander we're doing the best we can under difficult circumstances and we need to get along and not knock heads."

Unfortunately, Alexander was never able to completely grasp what Terry Allen was trying to say. His indifferent attitude towards American fighting prowess proliferated in Sicily and resulted in the initial assignment of Patton's Seventh Army to a secondary role in the quest for the island. As we know from the narrative on the planning debacles leading to the Invasion, Alexander also took a back seat to Montgomery's initiatives to define a strategy. As the beachheads were being seized during the first days of the occupation of the island, Alexander remained aloof about committing to a definitive plan for going inland. He instead opted to wait and see what the outcome of the first few days of battle were. After the war, his oral history about formulating a plan revealed, "I had no intention of doing so until Seventh Army had seized its assigned airfields and Eighth Army had control of the ports of Syracuse, Augusta and the plain of Catania."

By the 12th of July, the airfields at Ponte Olivio were captured by the 26th Infantry and the Second Battalion of the 18th while elements of the 16th had taken the airfield at Niscemi. On the same day, Alexander got a cipher telegram from Montgomery's Eighth Army headquarters reporting he had captured Augusta and that he "intended to operate on two axis." One of his armies was going to march to Catania, then northwards, while another would swing as far west to the center of the island through Enna. Montgomery ended his telegram with, "Suggest American Division at Comisco might move westward." The American Division at Comisco was the 45th Division. They were within a thousand yards of the road Montgomery wanted to make his westward swing on and also ideally positioned to open up the path to Enna.

At the time, Omar Bradley assessed the fitness of his Army by saying, "Our troops were in marvelously aggressive spirits, all having performed far beyond my wildest expectations." Despite this, without consulting Patton or Bradley, Alexander took Montgomery's advice and issued the order for the American Seventh Army to get out of the way of his Eighth Army and to basically protect their left flank while the British conquered Sicily.

According to Bradley, "This directive was the most arrogant, egotistical, selfish and dangerous move in the whole combined operations in World War II." Montgomery, who was first to learn that Alexander had approved the order, started moving his army right into the path of the 45th before Patton even got the same news from Alexander. The Seventh Army Commander did not find out about the directive until Alexander flew over to Gela and interrupted his lunch. Despite its very apparent flaws, an uncharacteristically demure George Patton merely accepted Alexander's order.

It is the belief of many historians and even Bradley that Patton's demeanor on July 13th was directly related to his meeting with Eisenhower on the Monrovia the day before. If he raised hell over Alexander's directive, Patton figured Eisenhower might turn on him once again and possibly sack him this time. Consequently, the Seventh Army Commander listened to Alexander's order and took it in stride.

Patton summoned Bradley to his headquarters at Gela on that fateful day, where the II Corps Commander found his boss "wreathed in cigar smoke, scanning a map." Without even looking up, Patton then broke the word; "We've received a directive from Army Group, Brad. Monty's to get the Vizzini-Caltagirone road in his drive to flank Catania and Mount Etna by going up through Enna. This means you'll have to sideslip west with your 45th Division."

Bradley later wrote his first reaction was to whistle. Then he remembered he said, "This will raise hell with us. I counted heavily on that road. Now if we've got to shift over, it'll slow up our entire advance." Grasping the practical aspects of this sudden surprise, a resigned Bradley quickly followed with the suggestion that he could reposition the 45th so it was to the left of Terry Allen's 1st Division. Bradley felt this was tactically sound and he told Patton, "Besides, we can probably keep Terry going and maintain the momentum of our attack."

Patton answered with "Sorry, Brad, but the changeover takes place immediately. Monty wants the road right away." This left Bradley with the problem of what to do with his two divisions.

Bradley did more than whistle in his post war autobiography. Referring to the events of July 13th, he said, "My staff and I were absolutely outraged. We at once perceived the full import of the decision: that Monty had nominated himself for the starring role on Sicily, leaving us to eat his dust. An entire American Army that had fought its way ashore was being wasted."

Unknown to Montgomery, his "starring role" would soon find itself challenged by a force far worse than theater critics. On the night of July 12th, the beat-up Hermann Goering Division retreated right into Montgomery's oncoming path at Catania. Airborne reinforcements began to arrive that evening. But, unlike the disastrous entry of the American paratroopers on Sicily, fighters escorted German parachutists and they completed flawless landings near Catania in the still of the night. The 15th Panzer Division that "The Man Who Never Was" had coerced to the western side of Sicily completed its move back to the middle of the island. They would wait for Montgomery at Enna. Even more Germans arrived within a few days. The 29th Panzers crossed the Straits of Messina and came down from a defensive position to protect the corridor between Catania and Enna. Montgomery's opening performances on the Sicilian stage were destined to be met by an iron curtain.

Meanwhile Bradley remembered, "I was executing Alexander's preposterous order silently and skillfully, but inwardly I was as hot as Mount Etna." Having been denied the roadway in front of the 45th Division, he had no choice but to load some 12,000 men into trucks and wheel them back to the beaches around the rear of the 1st Division and over to Terry Allen's left. Bradley later commented, "I was certain that Alexander could not have known how awkward was this movement into which his directive had forced our corps. For want of a day and a night on the Vizzini road, we were forced to disassemble our front and patch it together again."

The real goal was to slice the island in half and force the Germans back to mainland Italy. But, getting there was a problem. There were only four ways to the all-important city of Messina from the positions Bradley's II Corps held on the night of July 13th. Two roads were direct, but they ran up the east side of the island claimed by Montgomery. The other two were inland roadways that went up the island north of Enna. But, Enna would have to be taken first. As the crow flies, this capital city of Sicily was about twenty-five miles from where Pfc. Baummer and the Second Battalion were positioned after they captured the airdrome. Yet, posh route 117, which would have essentially let them march underneath the crow's flight path, was claimed by their British friends, obliging the 18th to climb into the hills to protect the side of Montgomery's drive northward. They, too, would have to side-step Enna.

At about the same time George Patton received Harold Alexander for lunch at Gela on July 13th, the 18th Infantry jumped off in a motor and foot march and seized the immediate ground a few miles ahead of them. Pfc. Baummer was again one of the lucky guys on foot, but his "Soldiers Guide to Sicily" was not detailed enough to tell him how many meters high the first two hills in front of him were. However, by nightfall he knew. The Germans left some of their best marksmen on these hills and they were well supplied with artillery. The 18th hastily moved out in a vigorous advance and tore into the enemy, ending the night after reaching the base of the rocky cliffs of Mount Ursitto.

Before bedding down in foxholes, a great story made the rounds. Morale always picked up when someone had a juicy tale to tell, particularly when it interrupted the serious business of war with laughter. Captain Murphy heard about it first, then it spread like wildfire throughout H Company. Apparently an Italian-American 1st Division soldier in the 16th Infantry was near an enemy emplacement during the German counterattacks on Gela Beach when he heard a phone start to ring. Undaunted, he stepped over to it, picked up the receiver and listened to an Italian commander bark out in his native tongue, "Are the US forces being repelled okay?" Supposedly the 1st Infantry soldier responded in perfect Italian, "Sure, go back to sleep and forget about them."

The 18th captured more hills and small towns the next morning. By mid-day they cleared out Mt. Delle, Zorofola and Cono. However, during the afternoon the Second Battalion ran into strong resistance on Mt. La Serra. Company F came in contact with the enemy at 1:00 PM and Captain Murphy quickly ordered Company H into the thick of things. Lieutenant Colonel Sternberg soon had the entire Second Battalion engaged. The fighting got pretty gruesome, so much so that Colonel Smith ordered the First Battalion to pass through the Second and assist in the attacks. La Serra finally fell late in the afternoon. Many prisoners were taken along with fifty vehicles before the enemy withdrew all along the line.

That night, Pfc. Baummer got to look at the latest copy of "Stars and Stripes," the soldier's newspaper and supply line of information. Even though the news was dated, the July 10th edition finally told the story of the last few days in bold print. Scanning the front page, he read the large headline that said: SICILY INVADED, ALLIED FORCES BEGIN LANDING OPERATIONS ON AXIS ISLAND. RADIOS WARN FRENCH PEOPLE TO WAIT FOR THE RIGHT MOMENT. Then, beneath the banner the story continued with "Allied forces under command of General Eisenhower began landing operations on Sicily early this morning. The landings were preceded by an allied air attack. Allied naval forces escorted the assault forces and bombarded the coast defenses during the assault." On the other side of the front page, the lead in was "Il Duce on the Spot; Pleads for Support." Pfc. Baummer looked at one of his buddies and asked him what he was thinking. Suddenly, they started grinning. "Yea," they said together, "Where the hell was this Allied air attack?"

The night of July 14th was one of the first nights on Sicily the men of the 18th Infantry got some rest. Sadly, however, one of Colonel Sternberg's best staff aides never got to sleep. Dick Koehler was out on a reconnaissance mission by himself trying to locate enemy positions. He started out on foot, but after he spotted a pocket of enemy soldiers and his work was finished, he hitched a ride back to camp on a passing jeep. While he was riding across a field back to the Second Battalion's command post, the jeep hit a mine and killed both Dick Koehler and his driver instantly. Sternberg could barely be consoled. Besides being one of his most reliable intelligence officers, Koehler was a good friend. Now he was gone.

Such began the ominous start into Sicily that would culminate after a month of near constant, fatiguing battles chasing Germans skilled in the art of rearguard warfare. This difficult period followed several days of some of the most horrific attacks the 1st had seen thus far in the war on Gela Beach. In the end, General Allen would write, "Our doughboys have been wandering around and fighting steadily for twenty-seven days and for at least fourteen nights. Their tenacity and loyalty in the face of terrific hardships were really fantastic." Never one without praise for his boys, Allen actually understated the Division's contributions in conquering Sicily. Before the battlefields quieted, the Big Red One captured the key city of Troina. Bradley heaped praise on the 1st Division, calling this conclusive struggle for the island "the most bitterly fought battle of the campaign."

The 1st's advance would eventually place the 18th Infantry seventy miles north at the hilly town of Petralia before the Regiment made a ninety-degree turn and headed east to play a key role in capturing Troina. The entire zone of advance, according to Terry Allen, "was over rough, mountainous roads and trails, cut into frequent gorges and canyons. Terrain difficulties, blown bridges and enemy roadblocks were a serious handicap." Allen organized the 1st Division into two flanks. The 18th was designated to stay on the west side of the zone and seize Petralia and the 16th would stay to the right with Enna as its principal mission. Curiously, as we know, Enna was also on Montgomery's dance card, but we shall see who got there first.

The 18th Infantry was joined by Teddy Roosevelt's 26th and the Division's Artillery Company. The battered 16th was to advance northward out of Niscemi through Caltigarone to reach Enna. Given Sicily's rugged terrain, only light armor could provide support. Thus Allen placed the 70th Tank Battalion right in the middle of the two zones so they could alternately support both columns of advancing infantry. The 91st Cavalry also covered the gap between the separated regiments. Later, an elite cavalry squadron of French native North Africans - the 4th Tabor of Goums - whose specialty was conducting savage mountain warfare on horseback, became attached to the 1st.

Back on the battlefield, Pfc. Baummer renewed his advance northward. After seizing Mt. La Serra, the 18th and the 26th captured Mazzarino. When the young soldier entered this reasonably large city, something told him it was not the first time this stronghold fell to an invading force. Mazzarino sat atop a cone-shaped hill and had provided excellent defensive positions for many ancient warriors. The city was once dominated by a castle, which probably at one time had been the culture and commerce center of Mazzarino. But on July 15, 1943, it lay in ruin in the afternoon sun and Pfc. Baummer would find no time for sightseeing. Instead, he was camped at the foot of the north slope behind Mazzarino staring at the plains ahead of him. In the dim-lit distance he thought he could make out the 18th's next objective. This target –Barrafranca- was important because an east-west railway passed through it. Reconnaissance had reported the village was heavily fortified, but it had to be taken to cut off the supply routes it afforded the enemy. While the 18th was initially held in a reserve position, Teddy Roosevelt's 26th made the first charge on the rail junction stronghold the next morning.

Barrafranca turned out to be heavily fortified with tanks from the reinforced Hermann Goering. Their armor was waiting atop the hills surrounding the town, prepared to strike any force breaking through the protective ring thinly held by their infantry. In honor of Teddy Roosevelt and the legend of his father, elements of the 26th had dubbed themselves the new "Rough Riders." President Theodore Roosevelt had first called his troops the "Rough Riders" when he led the famous San Juan Hill regiment in the Spanish American War. In his work on this conflict, author William Manchester wrote, "Roosevelt's First US Volunteer Cavalry was a hybrid of cowboys and bluebloods. Lean, slit-eyed plainsmen with names like Cherokee Bill and Rattlesnake Pete served beside men from Boston's Somerset Club and the Knickerbocker Club of New York, crack polo players, tennis champions, steeplechase riders, Princeton lineman, Yale's finest high-jumper, and a whole contingent from Teddy's Harvard, led by two quarterbacks."

Now his son, accompanied by a cross-section of America's finest doughboys cut from different bolts of cloth, but possessed with no less devotion than his father's hand-picked regiment, was slicing up Sicily.

Roosevelt's Sherman tanks crawled cagily up to the assault line near Barrafranca and camouflaged themselves in olive trees. It became apparent that the Germans were not going to give up easily and when the tanks charged, two were immediately blown to bits. Their crews jumped out, but were shot up by enemy machine gun fire. The 26th's artillery companies quickly jumped into the thick of it and a combination of 105s and 155s shook the earth in anger with thunderous salvos. Under the cover of this murderous barrage, the 26th's infantrymen took off towards a slope and into an orchard the Germans were known to be hiding in. The "Rough Riders" flashed their bayonets at the hated Hermann Goering infantrymen, then mounted direct frontal assaults, firing as they lurched forward until they had the enemy engaged in hand-to-hand combat. The Germans reeled back in stunned confusion, assuming they would have time to regroup and plan their counterstrike.

Apparently they had not yet absorbed the 1st Division's playbooks, for Roosevelt ordered his men to renew the attack almost immediately. Before the soldiers of the Hermann Goering could dust off their uniforms, lead elements of the 26th were surging across the slopes and through the woods overrunning their positions. The Germans never had a chance. Unable to muster armor support quickly enough, Barrafranca fell.

The 18th Infantry moved to an assembly area just outside of the city that night. All that remained in Barrafranca were piles of trucks, guns, much equipment and dead men. Fifteen German tanks were destroyed before the rest high-tailed it out of town, blowing up every bridge in their wake after they crossed over them. Both Teddy Roosevelt and Colonel Smith ordered reconnaissance patrols out to locate the enemy's new positions. Meanwhile, Pfc. Baummer and the 18th Infantry advanced towards Caltanisetta and Villarmoso, continuing their excellent progress in the push to reach Petralia.

During this same day, General George Patton went over to Harold Alexander's headquarters in Tunis to propose that the Seventh Army be given a route to attack up the Messina neck to the Straits. Patton was back in the saddle by the 17th of July. In addition to the 1st Division's drive up the center of Sicily, Patton's forces had made strong progress in the western part of the island and were steadily advancing on Palermo. The 45th Division finally got away from the Gela Beaches after moving to the left of the 1st Infantry and was making tremendous strides against slackening enemy resistance in their spirited advance towards Palermo.

When Patton arrived at Alexander's headquarters, he was greeted icily. Perhaps it was the company he brought with him. Two major generals had come along to help him with oral arguments. One was the astute and diplomatic Major General Albert Wedemeyer, who was destined to become Chief of Staff to Lord Louis Mountbatten. But, the other was the caustic Major General Clarence Huebner, who always irritated Alexander. Regardless, the British commander quickly realized the trio had arrived prepared to get a definitive role for the Seventh Army. It was a very deliberate meeting. Alexander, while ruffled by Patton's creation of a tense atmosphere, realized the Seventh Army's Commander had good points and gave him what he wanted.

The next day, he issued an official order allowing Patton "to take advantage of the situation by pushing north a detachment to cut the coast road thereby splitting the island in two. As soon as you are firmly established on the general line CAMPOFELICE - PETRALIA - CATERINA - CALTANISSETTA – AGRIGENTO, you will advance westward to mop up the western half of Sicily, but this operation must not be started before you are ready to operate from a secure base."

It was most fortuitous for Patton that Alexander acceded to his wishes. Before he went to Tunis he was mad as hell about his Seventh Army's secondary role on Sicily. Patton had written in his diary the morning of his visit, "I shall explain to General Alexander on the basis that it would be inexpedient politically for the Seventh Army not to have glory in the final stage of the campaign." Politics was definitely not one of Patton's strong suits. But he needed to get back into his boss's graces and dealing firmly with Alexander was a way to do this. One of Eisenhower's "eyes and ears" on Sicily, General John P. Lucas, had informed the Supreme Commander of the problems he saw on the island at about the time Patton went to see Alexander. In a conversation with Eisenhower shortly after the Patton/Alexander showdown, the Supreme Commander had told Lucas, "Patton must stand up to General Alexander and fight for what he thinks is right." Then, grasping the reins of command even tighter, Eisenhower later reinforced his point and told Lucas "to see that Patton was made to realize that he would not hesitate to relieve him from command if he did not do so."

Alexander may have unwittingly saved Patton from Eisenhower's wrath, but there were other matters that were weighing heavily on the Ground Force Commander's mind. While some elements of Patton's Seventh Army were converging on the western side of Sicily and the 1st Division was slicing up its center on two fronts, General Montgomery was having a bit of a problem on the east side of island.

By July 17th, his entire Eighth Army was stopped outside of Catania where the combined local forces of Hitler's Germany were stretched from the mountains to the sea all the way across malarial marshes to block his path. Down but not defeated, Montgomery launched a strike the next day which included support from airborne troops and more British reinforcements that had been rushed into the line from nearby amphibian landing sites. But Montgomery's forces again failed to penetrate the German defenses. His biographer later recollected Montgomery's drive was spread out over too large an area, even going so far as to say, "For once Monty had let down his army by overambitiousness and his lack of ruthless adherence to his own rule of concentration in strength."

At the time, Carlo D'Este said, "The campaign in eastern Sicily was almost out of control and was being fought on four separate fronts." Nevertheless, Montgomery remained optimistic and in a wire to Alexander on July 17th, he told his boss his "next planned four thrusts are very strong and the enemy will not be able to hold them at all." Despite all the hurrah, Montgomery made little progress. By the night of the 19th he even confessed to his diary, "The enemy is securely positioned in Catania itself, which is a strong bastion. My troops are getting tired as the heat in the plain of Catania is great."

On July 20th Harold Alexander finally realized his favorite general had taken on too much and sent a TWX to Patton's headquarters confirming his license to conquer Sicily. The Seventh Army was given permission to turn east and to eventually use the north road up the neck towards Messina. Apparently Alexander was fully resigned to the fact that he needed the forces of the United States Army after all.

As these events were unfolding, Pfc. Baummer and the men of the 18th Infantry were continuing their drive northward. Patton could not go up the western part of the island and head up the neck until Petralia fell and General Allen had issued orders for the 18th and 26th to move with alacrity. After the advancing Americans passed through Caltanisetta, the Germans took stock of their situation at Villarmoso and withdrew. The next objective became Alimena, some fourteen miles farther to the north over terrible roads and blown bridges. A spirited march over this terrain would break most soldiers, but the Fighting First's men were accustomed to pleasing their commanding general. When they got to Alimena, the enemy showed formidable artillery strength, but they were simply no match for the advancing drive. Alimena fell on the 21st. Then Pfc. Baummer got one of his first breaks in Sicily.

It is difficult to comprehend how men lived under the circumstances war thrust upon them. Yet, Ernie Pyle put this in perspective when he wrote a column about the plight of the infantrymen on Sicily. The popular columnist explained:

"The front line soldier I knew had lived for months like an animal and was a veteran in the fierce world of death. Everything was abnormal and unstable in his life. He was filthy dirty, ate if and when, slept on hard ground without cover. His clothes were greasy and he lived in a constant haze of dust, pestered by flies and heat, moving constantly, deprived of all things that once meant stability - things such as walls, floors, windows, faucets, shelves, coca-colas and the little matter of knowing whether he would go to bed at night in the same place he had left in the morning."

Luxuries on the battlefield were certainly rare. A good night's sleep was always looked forward to. A shower was usually out of the question, although wading through a stream might give a soldier a chance to clean up. Pfc. Baummer got none of these. But before midnight on the 22nd of July, he was finally able to get off his feet and get a ride in a motor convoy to the Petralia zone. However, the ten-mile ride was bumpy and not uneventful. Company H detrucked just after 4:00 AM on the 23rd in the vicinity of Bompietro and the men were soon heavily engaged against a new German weapon - the Nebelwerfer.

One of the most terrifying weapons of World War II, the Nebelwerfer was described by an 18th Infantry anti-tank company officer as "rocket-principled; this invention consisted of 6-inch barrels mounted on an extremely light and maneuverable carriage pulled by a small truck. When dropped in the firing position the Nebelwerfer fired six rounds in five seconds by pressing a button, thus giving it the fastest and most effective high-angle fire known. It was, in fact, a gigantic mortar." While most of the men remained calm during the first attacks by the new weapon, at least two of the Second Battalion's infantrymen had to be evacuated because of shell shock during their brief first skirmish with this miniature rotating cannon from Hell.

Pfc. Baummer was again one of the lucky ones. But survival also meant he would be quickly pressed into service for the assault on Petralia. By 8:00 AM the following morning, after what Terry Allen called "several hours of sharp night fighting," the 18th Infantry succeeded in capturing the ancient town. Its only apparent real value was a supply road that passed through it and the Second Battalion was ordered to establish a strongpoint at the junction leading up to it. However, it was soon learned the vigorous night attack had caught the Germans so off-guard that they simply pulled out of town. The Second Battalion had one of their easier nights on Sicily and, with Petralia secure, George Patton could now advance up the western side of Sicily and go for the Straits of Messina.

While the 18th Infantry continued northward, several important things happened elsewhere. By the time Pfc. Baummer reached Petralia, both the 45th Division and the 3rd Division had made their way to Palermo. Patton was chomping at the bit to beat Montgomery up the neck to Messina. His competition was still stalled during the last days of July in positions not far from the Catania Plains. Frustrated that the Hermann Goering had held him off across his new zone, Montgomery decided to split his forces and execute what he called a "left hook." This meant sending his Canadian forces even closer to the advancing columns of the 1st Division's 16th Infantry, while Montgomery’s own forces tried to crack through the Hermann Goering along the northern bank of the Simeto River basin.

But both of Montgomery's armies again took heavy casualties. The Canadians were bogged down until the 23rd - the day Petralia fell - by the German 15th Panzer Division. Even though they succeeded in taking the key town of Assoro, it only put a small dent in the southern edge of the enemy defenses. However, the Canadians found the Germans were suddenly changing their battle plans. Up to now, they had been forfeiting position to retreat and establish strongpoints to their rear to await the next attack. Now, they were apparently going to hold their ground. As the Canadian's official historians later noted, "They made slow and difficult progress across the mountains during the next two weeks and became bitterly familiar with the resolute defense of the German panzer grenadiers and paratroopers."

Meanwhile, Montgomery was still being held off near the Simeto River, where the Hermann Goering was polishing its tarnished image after the beating it took by the 1st Division on Gela Beach. Montgomery mounted a strong offensive in an attempt to take a nearby airfield, but his forces were again set back. By July 23rd the Eighth Army was in such a state of dysfunction that he pulled one of his divisions out of the line and directed them to move over to a defensive position nearer the Canadian zone where, according to his order, "The resistance was not so strong."

In contrast, II Corps Commander Omar Bradley summarized the US positions in his sector: "After splitting Sicily in two and cutting the north coast road, Army Group now stiffened its original directive for the US attack towards Messina. We were ordered to thrust eastward along the coast road and the road to Nicosia-Troina-Cesaro while employing the maximum strength we could maintain." Army Group, of course, was Harold Alexander, whose sudden confidence in American fighting ability was by now well founded. Bradley issued orders for the 45th Division to head north out of Palermo and for the 18th and 26th Infantries of the 1st to pivot east onto the Nicosia-Troina road.

Meanwhile, there was a little cleaning up to do around Enna. The fortress stood on a commanding hill mass and had proven to be an elusive conquest for the British forces. Montgomery delegated the task of taking Enna to the 1st Canadian Division as part of his "left hook" strategy. But the Germans were heavily dug in around the city and had set up particularly strong defenses on the south side atop the hill masses that stood at the foot of the stronghold. The Canadian's first charge was quickly repulsed, so they slipped around to the right looking for another way to approach the enemy positions. This left the area south of the town wide open to the approaching 1st Division's 16th Infantry and an opportunity Omar Bradley was not going to miss. Using the immediate danger to his open northern positions as his impetus to move out, Bradley sent a message to the Canadian commander saying, "I have just learned you have sideslipped Enna leaving my flank exposed. Accordingly, we are proceeding to take Enna at once even though it is in your sector. I assume we have the right to use any of your roads for this attack."

Bradley found the Canadian commander to be not only prompt, but also apologetic in his response to the message. He assured Bradley that the roads were his and to evidence his sincerity and remorse for not having communicated it better before he slipped away from Enna, the Canadian sent the tea-totaling Bradley two bottles of Scotch.

Bradley quickly passed the order to attack the capital city on to Terry Allen. Allen responded by moving two battalions of the 16th Infantry eastward where they assembled on the high ground southeast of the city. He sent reconnaissance patrols out during the night of July 19th to stalk the German defenses. Allen subsequently moved the 70th Tank Battalion from the middle of the island over to join the 16th early in the morning of the 20th. The Master of the Night Attack then ordered the tanks up the road to Enna with the 16th Infantry in tow. According to Allen, "Their advance was marred only by scattered and ineffective artillery fire. Then, quick, sharp maneuvering by the 16th, under the direction of a new regimental commander, resulted in the city being taken and ‘mopped-up’ by noon." It seemed that the Germans had again retreated and fallen back further north towards Troina.

Colonel Benjamin A. "Monk" Dickson was Bradley's Chief of Staff for Intelligence during the Sicilian campaign and an impassioned student of history. Reflecting on the Battle for Enna, he later told Bradley, "Not bad, not bad at all. It took the Saracens 20 years in their siege of Enna. Our boys did it in five hours."

The next day, the 16th took a town eight miles northeast of Enna and on the 23rd they joined up with the rest of the Division at Petralia. They had moved fast because they were hopping mad. The night Enna fell, the official word out of Great Britain by way of the BBC was that the British had captured Enna "in their spectacular drive northward." Even Eisenhower, whose pro-British bias irked many of his commanders, was reported to have been "brought to the boiling point by the omission of the 1st Infantry Division's accomplishments." He quickly wrote a strongly worded letter to Churchill denouncing the accuracy of the BBC's reporting.

During mid-July, Eisenhower had told several reporters if everything went satisfactorily Sicily would cave-in around the 27th of that month. It was not going to turn out that way, for the Germans had proven to be quite stubborn in holding their ground. Since the 1st Division broke out of the Gela beachhead, they had already advanced through seventy miles of the roughest mountain terrain the troops had ever seen, essentially cutting the island in two on its central south to north routes. Yet, there was still nearly more than a week's work left for the 1st Division before their mission in Sicily was over and the island itself would not fall until August 17th, three weeks later than Eisenhower's prediction. The reporter's pool had a bet going. When Omar Bradley was asked how long it would take to capture Sicily aboard the Ancon during the crossing to Gela Beach, he had said forty days. He was only off by two. Most had bet on Bradley.

On the day the 16th Infantry took Enna, Pfc. Baummer was exhausted. The hills, the heat, the stress of battle and little sleep were taking a toll. He had been in the line for fourteen days. Yet he could not sleep. The 18th had been alerted to be prepared to move out towards Nicosia to ward off an enemy build up. Nicosia was about twenty-five miles to the east and the thought of having to jump off so quickly made Pfc. Baummer even more tired. As he waited for Captain Murphy's orders, he stared off at the brush-covered mountains surrounding the next enemy target. No more hills today, he prayed. Then he scanned the battlefields directly to his east. More hills. He gazed over the mountains many more miles eastward and took in Mt. Etna. At 11,000 feet, the volcano was both prominent and spectacular. It was also active. He could see great clouds of smoke and ash pouring into the air. He wondered if the ash was hot when it landed. Someone told him the British were fighting in the shadows of the volcano. He guessed they would know.

Then he thought the smoke and ash were probably harmless. Hell, he figured, the wind was usually blowing west to east and the British were west of the flaming crown of the volcano. So, it had to be harmless. But, he also knew he was heading in that direction and he wondered what he would do if the wind changed its mind. He looked at his map of Sicily and determined that Mt. Etna was about twenty miles past Troina. He only had to make it to Troina, so he started to care less and less about the ashes.

When the Germans fled from Petralia, they left mines all along the roads and placed booby traps everywhere in the hills. The main road to Nicosia was along route 120, but Pfc. Baummer knew the 18th would not be afforded the luxury of highway travel. But, at the end of the day he did get some good news. The 18th was ordered to move out, but only to Gangi, which was about six miles away. A rumor too good to be true spread quickly. The 18th was going to be bivouacked and given a day or two off from war. No luxuries, just rest. The engineers went first and swept away the mines. Then the trucks came and got the doughboys. Pfc. Baummer never slept better on the battlefield than he did that night in Gangi.

While the 18th rested, General Allen prepared his plan of maneuvers carefully. He was also anxious to move out quickly. He had some surprises planned for the Germans and decided to start the advance towards Nicosia on July 24th by moving Teddy Roosevelt's 26th Infantry out into the hills just east of Gangi. About 280 Guoms - those savage horsemen from French Morocco - were committed to the trackless mountains on the north flank of the 1st's advance. Allen also planned to send the 18th Infantry to the north, so the Guoms and the men of the Regiment became friends.

Pfc. Baummer did get two days of rest. The men of the 26th did not. After taking the hills immediately east of Gangi, they continued their advance towards Nicosia. Moving eastward, they seized six more hills and by the afternoon of July 26th they were just west of the city. General Allen ordered the men to contain the enemy forces by firing upon them, but not to advance into Nicosia just yet.

While the "Rough Riders" advanced, Pfc. Baummer had enough sleep to muster the energy to write a letter home on the evening of July 24th. Even he was optimistic about a quick end to the fighting in Sicily.

Dear Mom;

I guess that it's about time that I wrote to you again so you will know that I am still all right. We are on an island called Sicily and I suppose that you know by now that it has been invaded by the British and us. By the time you receive this letter it should be over and I expect to be here when it does end, if you know what I mean. I haven't received any mail since we landed on the island, so I have not received any letters as yet and I don't know who has written to me, but we will no doubt get some mail pretty soon.

I hope that you are getting along all right and that you will be a good girl until I get home. Don't work too hard and please don't forget to write.

Let me know how everything is going around town and I shall be hoping to see you soon.

Love,

Bob

P.S. Give everyone my love.

The well-rested 18th was ordered out of Gangi the day after Pfc. Baummer wrote this letter. Each Battalion swung wide to the north and moved parallel to route 120 about a kilometer away from the road. Pfc. Baummer soon learned the 18th had been ordered to make their way to a position north of Nicosia where they were to block a roadway exit from the town. So they marched all night long and into the next afternoon. They ran into some resistance, but controlled the road by 3:30. As General Allen later wrote, "These flanking maneuvers were exhausting operations, made under the cover of darkness over mountainous terrain. This use of extensive infantry maneuver was expensive on shoe leather, but it did secure a quick tactical success with a minimum of battlefield casualties."

Meanwhile, the 16th Infantry flanked out on the south side of Route 120 and had command of the high ground by nightfall on July 26th. Terry Allen had his infantry units perfectly positioned. They controlled the key terrain, had the exit roads blocked and were prepared for a frontal attack.

But, the man who first attracted Army Chief of Staff Marshall's attention with his imaginative handling of troop maneuvers was going to try something new. Never one to waste his men, Allen ordered the primary attack on Nicosia to be made by tanks at night. To his knowledge, no one had ever done this before, but this was not going to stop him. At 8:30 PM on the night of July 27th, elements of the 70th Light Tank Battalion and a company of medium tanks jumped off on their quick foray from Gangi. Intelligence reports indicated the Germans were going to make an "all-out" defense at Nicosia, but Allen was sure he would annihilate them instead.

The tanks were at the edge of the city by 9:00 o'clock. Cloaked in darkness, they blasted away at the German defenders. Colonel Smith reported to Terry Allen, "They sprayed for miles around for ten to fifteen minutes before receiving enemy fire." The sudden shelling completely surprised the Germans and to Allen's elation it took their attention away from his flanking riflemen. The 1st Division Commander had also positioned artillery units in the hills. The Germans were harassed all night long by medium howitzers and "Long Toms." With the 18th and 16th surrounding them and the 26th poised for a direct attack, the stunned and completely frazzled German defenders laid down their arms and surrendered to the 16th Infantry at noon on the 28th. Allen's maneuvers were more than imaginative. They saved many lives. Only one 1st Division soldier was killed in the main attacks on Nicosia. Five were wounded, mostly from incendiary bullets or thermite bombs.

The German forces at the medieval town included the hardened Panzer Grenadier Regiment, a Nebelwerfer heavy mortar battalion and a depleted Italian division. Over a thousand prisoners were taken and those who did escape tried to retreat towards Troina. Many were chased down by elements of the 18th Infantry. Others got away, but it would only be a matter of a couple more days before they would once again go up against the 1st Division and the Master of the Night Attack.

An anti-tank company lieutenant in the 18th Infantry remembered Nicosia for its pageantry. He wrote, "As we drove warily over the cobbles of the steep and narrow alleys, we are greeted by what seemed to be the whole citizenry. The welcomers, officiously led by the mayor and the chief of the ‘carbinere,’ bombarded us with kisses, bottles of vino, flowers and fruit (not as missiles). The priest blessed us for saving the town from Mussolini, never realizing that the men really responsible for its deliverance were now wearily marching toward their next objective, Troina."

The priest did not know it at the time he blessed the lieutenant, but Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini, son of a peasant and the man who held Fascist rule over Italy and Sicily for part of a generation, was removed from power two days earlier by the King of Italy. By the time the priest was sanctifying the lieutenant, Mussolini had been arrested and taken away in an ambulance to a hidden location, presumably for his own protection.

When Pfc. Baummer heard about Mussolini's downfall, the first thing he thought was that it might mean Sicily would also fall, ending the war right then and there. But, as Captain Murphy led his men in chasing Nazis towards Troina, the stark reminder Germany was still going to fight this war was everywhere. There were plenty of mines, artillery shells, blown up bridges and booby traps in their path. Mussolini might be gone, but Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich still expected to conquer the world, even if they were presently going backwards.

Troina lay some twelve miles northeast of Nicosia. According to Omar Bradley's description, "Troina clung to a mountain top like an ancient fortress." For several reasons, Terry Allen said, "The Battle for Troina developed into the toughest and most significant battle of the entire Sicilian Campaign." The Germans dug themselves in for a "do or die" stand at all costs. They took every advantage of the defensive terrain around the tops of the mountains where they occupied the high ground north, west and south of the stronghold. Intelligence reports revealed that the defenders included elements of the 15th SS Panzer Division and part of the Hermann Goering. As if this was not enough, the Germans reinforced Troina with a Motorized Infantry Division and the 382nd Separate Infantry Regiment complete with special artillery and mortar units.

In preparation for the Battle of Troina, Bradley decided to reinforce the 1st Division with a detached infantry regiment of the 9th Division. This unit had landed in Palermo harbor a few days earlier and was commanded by the colorful Colonel Harry A. "Paddy" Flint from St, Johnsbury, Vermont. His boss, 9th Division commanding general, Monton Eddy, first presented Flint to Terry Allen and Omar Bradley. Terry Allen immediately found him to be his kind of man. When Paddy Flint was not within earshot, Eddy took Bradley and Terry Allen aside and showed him Flint's helmet. There were four sharply painted letters - "AAA-O" - on its side. Somewhat bemused, Bradley asked, "And just what the hell does that mean?" Eddy shot back, "It means Anything, anytime, anywhere, bar nothing! Paddy has had this thing stenciled on every damned helmet and every damned truck in the whole damned regiment." A corps commander and two major generals simply turned their backs on this violation of II Corps regulations. They understood Paddy Flint. He was out to inspire his men and at the moment that was more important than silly Army rules. When George Patton heard about the "simple country boy's" artwork, he was delighted.

Allen was pleased to have Flint with him for he was also a cavalry officer during the inter-war years. Paddy Flint was regarded by Omar Bradley as:

Flint was definitely 1st Division material. And, as if Paddy Flint was not enough, the ever pragmatic Bradley made sure that the 1st's Artillery was reinforced by seven additional battalions. The Big Red One was as well equipped as it was going to be for the all-important Battle for Troina.

General Allen decided to put Flint right to work and sent him out to capture the small town of Cerami which was about five miles west of Troina. Allen wanted this to become the area of departure for the rest of the 1st Division and he needed to set up his command post and get communication lines in place. Paddy Flint jumped off at 8:00 PM on the evening of July 30th and predictably took Cerami. Terry Allen immediately found the perfect place for his battle station. It was a damp, empty schoolhouse still decorated with the Fascist slogan "Believe, Obey, Fight." Before the Battle for Troina was over, this 1st Division command post would live up to its own legendary nickname of "Danger Forward." Terry Allen had located a battalion of 155-mm. "Long Toms" directly behind the schoolhouse. Their blasts would shoot right over the roof of the building while Allen worked at his field desk. It would also become an inadvertent target of "friendly bombing" at an inopportune time when Omar Bradley was having a meeting with Terry Allen during the Troina battles. The incident would force the II Corps commander to jump into a ditch.

Anticipating quick counterattacks by the Germans, Allen circled the forces of the 1st Division around Troina. The 16th Infantry was deployed on the south flank of town where they were daringly positioned for direct frontal attacks on the enemy. The 26th Infantry went north while Paddy Flint's 39th proceeded east to cover the central sector facing Troina. The 18th Infantry was held in reserve behind Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders.

The first attacks on Troina began at 5:00 AM on the morning of August 1, 1943. All forward units moved out with orders to try to find where the weaknesses were in the enemy defenses. There had been isolated skirmishes the previous day, but the first coordinated attacks revealed the enemy was determined to repel the invaders. According to Terry Allen, "Their counterattacks were sharply delivered." August 2nd started innocently enough with a call from Omar Bradley to Allen's schoolhouse command post where a quick exchange about the situation was delivered to the Corps Commander. Allen advised Bradley, "Troina's going to be tougher than we thought. The Kraut's touchy as hell here."

Bradley then updated Allen on his plans. He told him the 9th Division, which had completed its landings in Palermo, was on its way to relieve the 1st Division. He told Allen "to commit only those units actually required to complete the capture of Troina" prior to the arrival of the 9th. But, this admonition from Bradley came just two days after both he and Allen had over optimistically forecasted that the 39th Regiment could take the mountain top fortress alone. Even Paddy Flint asked for another chance to crack Troina after being forced back on the morning of August 1st.

As Terry Allen absorbed the events around him, he took several things into consideration. First and foremost, Troina had to be taken. If the 1st Division was to be pulled out of the line, there had to be a good reason for it. At the time Allen heard of the 1st's relief from Bradley, he was not informed of the big picture. Bradley later wrote, "In quality the 1st was worth the equal of several inexperienced divisions. It had become an almost irreplaceable weapon for the Normandy Invasion." But, on August 2, 1943 Allen's focus was a little different. His spirit and pride in the Big Red One would not allow him to leave a job unfinished. To him, it was unsound to bring a new division into the midst of a battle that had already started, particularly when his forces were in a position to mop up. By mid-afternoon Allen made his decision and he issued fresh orders for Paddy Flint to go ahead with his frontal assault and for the 26th to renew their attacks from the north. Word started to leak out about the planned relief by the 9th, whereupon Allen recorded, "1st Division Headquarters reminded all 1st Division units of their moral obligation to button up the capture of Troina before being relieved."

The 26th Infantry, supported by artillery batteries of 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers, assaulted the Germans on the afternoon of the 22nd. But, it was not a good afternoon for either Teddy Roosevelt's or Paddy Flint's troops. Both were met by sharp German firepower and their forward progress was completely stalled. General Allen quickly received reports indicating that captured Germans had revealed the town was to be held at all costs.

During the same afternoon, Pfc. Baummer and the rest of the 18th Infantry received word they were to move out that night to the southern flank behind the 16th Infantry. Fortunately, the move was completed by truck because the 18th was going to need every bit of physical and mental stamina it could muster to take Troina. It took the entire night and most of the next day for all of the 18th's Regiments to get into position. Two field artillery battalions joined them and all units completed their moves in the early evening hours of August 3rd.

But, Pfc. Baummer and the Second Battalion companies were the first units to leave for their new position and they had been pressed into service the previous night. At 3:00 AM Terry Allen ordered simultaneous attacks from the north, east and south, whereupon the Rough Riders, Paddy Flint's men, the 16th Infantry, Pfc. Baummer and the Second Battalion of the 18th all got ready to jump off. Allen later reported the 26th made "some progress," and Flint "improved his former position." He noted the 16th, reinforced by the Second Battalion of the 18th Infantry under the command of the seasoned Lt. Colonel Ben Sternberg, "made definitive progress." Owing much of its success to Sternberg's companies, Allen noted "This Battalion aggressively seized certain critical terrain features on that flank, aggressively extending the attack on the south flank contributed greatly to the quick success of the Division in this final attack."

It was obvious to every commander assigned to the Division that Terry Allen was going to revert to his proven tactics of night attacks. True to form, the Fighting First renewed their assault on Troina under the cover of darkness, again at 3:00 AM, on the morning of August 4th. The 18th Infantry was fighting with all three of its battalions in place and by noon they had made substantial and history-making progress on their critical flank.

According to Terry Allen, "The continuing progress of the 18th Infantry Regiment in this attack on the south flank proved to be the decisive factor in the Battle for Troina. The enemy's loss of this commanding high ground on the deep south flank had a telling effect."

The First Battalion advanced even further into the enemy's protective positions over the next twelve hours and, by evening on the 5th of August, they had seized Mount Pelligrino, the highest point dominating the entire Troina area. Long-range marksmen bombarded Troina throughout the night. Despite stiff enemy resistance in the early morning hours accompanied by artillery airbursts, squads of the 1st Battalion advanced at the German positions and found many to be abandoned. Allen later wrote that the seizure of Mount Pelligrino "demoralized the enemy's defenses."

Near the end of the battles, the 1st Division had already survived twenty-four "jarring counterattacks" and the men were finally joined in their assault on Troina by the Army's air forces. As Bradley recorded:

"On the late afternoon of August 4th, I waited at a bend in the road, high up in Cerami to witness this air attack, the heaviest to date in our Sicilian campaign. Thirty-six fighters circled overhead, each loaded with 500-pound bombs. The bombers peeled off in a near vertical dive. Soon the crown of Troina was wreathed in dust. By the time a second flight of thirty-six more planes bombed the stricken city, Troina lay half obscured under a column of gray dust which partially hid the cone of Mount Etna."

The Germans had enough and began to withdraw the next day. Allen quickly ordered the tanks of the 1st Division to move forward and chase them. On the sunny morning of August 6th, while dazed soldiers in the 18th Infantry were recovering from their assault on the fortress, elements of the 16th scaled the steep side of Troina in the face of desultory rear-guard resistance and entered the destroyed city streets where the nauseous odor of death had settled over the town. The Battle for Troina, which General Eisenhower later called "one of the most fiercely fought smaller actions of the war," was over.

The toll on the 1st Division was high. The Fighting First was decimated after Troina. As Bradley noted, "After campaigning in Sicily the 1st Division was painfully reduced in strength. Sergeants were commanding platoons for the lack of officer replacements." In fact, nearly 1,600 1st Division soldiers were killed and so many were wounded that the entire Division was down to forty percent of its allocated strength.

The Division's stand in the 18th Infantry zone on the south flank left hundreds of others severely wounded or missing in action. Captain Murphy was hit and pulled out of the line. After days of massive artillery fire, Nebelwerfer mortar attacks, airbursts from what the infantrymen called "Bouncing Betty's" and bomb explosions over Troina, Pfc. Baummer lay dazed against a rock, blank-faced and ashen. He started talking about things that didn't even relate to the battlefield. His sergeant called for the medics, thinking the young soldier had cracked. They took his temperature and felt his pulse. He was hot, but his heart rate was normal.

The medics quickly diagnosed him to be suffering from a form of "anxiety neurosis" and told the sergeant that they better evacuate him. This is when the battle-hardened soldier snapped and loudly protested being pulled out of the line. The medics tried to reason with him. They told him that the battle had been won. It was OK. His buddies didn't need him. Besides, the whole Division was going to be relieved. He didn't buy it. He wanted to stay with Company H, so he made a proposal. Promise me I can come back to my company and I'll go with you. The medics were well trained. They knew the most important thing they needed to do was to get this young First Class Private where he could be observed. The deal was made. Two soldiers helped their buddy up and they took him over to a jeep, where he was removed to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital just outside of Nicosia. He was placed under sedation for forty-eight hours and then sent back to his beloved company.

The low men on the totem poll were not the only casualties at Troina. In one of the most embarrassing incidents of the war, an order issued by General Bradley, which was suppose to be presented by him personally, instead inadvertently reached Terry Allen's command post in the schoolhouse at Cerami. Although the order was sensitive, some bungler had placed it in the daily mail pouch from II Corps headquarters. When a clerk at Allen's Command Post opened up the day's correspondence, he rushed the order over to Allen's Chief of Staff who then sought the advice of the Division's G-2 officer. Although they were both personally astounded by what they had read, they hurriedly discussed whether they should inform their boss of the order's contents. Deferring to the rationale that others would know, they felt it best to let General Allen see what was happening.

Allen was briefing subordinates on the next attack at the time. He read the order handed to him, then turned to his G-2 man and whispered, "Bob, what do I do with this?" Tears showed in Allen's eyes, but he continued to give instructions to his staff. He got on the phone and talked to Bradley when his briefing was over, but the II Corps Commander said, "Carry on, we'll sort this out later."

Not long afterwards, the phone rang and it was George Patton. Bradley must have called him to let him know Terry Allen had the news. Patton then asked him if the order for his relief had arrived, to which Allen said, "Yes." Patton then whined in his squeaky voice, "Well, you're not relieved. I say you're not relieved until you've taken Troina and the 1st Division has completed its job in Sicily!" Later, George Patton came down to Terry Allen's command post to console his friend.

Allen was as stunned as any of his doughboys, but he had the presence of mind to turn to the person who comforted him the most in times of trouble.

My dear Mary Fran;

I just received orders today, which came as a great surprise and the actual meaning of which I do not exactly know. Ted and I both have been relieved from the Division and have been directed to report to the American Commander in Chief (Eisenhower) at Algiers for future assignment.

George Patton came around to see me today and said that he understood that I was being relieved from the First Division. He also said that before doing so I would be temporarily attached to American Headquarters in Algiers and there would be held temporarily at British Headquarters in order to confer with them about the combat methods and tactics of the 1st Division during eight months of campaigning and particularly its actions with the Navy during the Sicilian Invasion. All of this, of course, was merely Patton's supposition and I really don't know what my exact status will be until I have reported to Eisenhower.

Ted R. does not know what his next assignment will be. Personally, I did not expect to be promoted to be Corps Commander. The accomplishments of the First Division would have been equally as good under almost anyone else.

Needless to say, I will be overjoyed at the prospect of any assignment which allows a return home with you again, my dear, even though my actual start date may be a bit delayed and the distant future may involve another combat assignment.

Frankly, my dear, the conceptions that most people have of actual combat is all wet. There is very little thrill to it. It's a dirty lousy job that must be accomplished as quickly as possible, with the maximum damage to the enemy and the least damage to our own soldiers. By now, you will surely understand how impossible it was for me to leave or to seek an assignment which would have evaded the responsibilities thrust upon me.

Actually, relief from the Division here will not be effective until the results after these actions I am involved in have ceased. That is, we must finish the actual battles we are now engaged in until the Division has been withdrawn from the front lines and we can turn it over to my successor. Clarence Huebner will succeed me.

It will be a wrench to leave the "Fighting First." We have survived some hard times together and the whole gang has loyally stood by me. Our doughboys have been wandering around steadily for 27 days and at least 14 nights. Their tenacity and loyalty in the face of terrific hardships are really fantastic.

My dearest love to you and Sonny and my love to your mother. Please understand dearest that I cannot wait to see you.

I love you sweetheart.

Yours,

Terry